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Abstract
This paper considers the design of taxes on real money balances and bank payment ser-
vices, when realistically, the household can use either cash or a bank payment account
for the purchase of different varieties of goods. These taxes, plus a consumption tax,
fund a government revenue requirement. We find that generally, real money balances
and bank transaction fees should be taxed, and at different rates, i.e. the tax system
should not leave the choice of payment services undistorted. For a wide class of time
transactions cost technologies, including the Baumol-Tobin case, fees should be taxed
at a lower rate than real money balances, and the tax on real money balances should
be positive. However, it is possible that fees should be subsidized. The rate of tax on
fees has no simple relationship to the optimal consumption tax, and can be higher or
lower. A Corlett-Hague type intuition for these results is also developed, which relies
on the concept of a virtual time endowment.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses a relatively neglected issue, the optimal taxation of payment
services. By payment services, we mean the services provided by the banking system
that facilitate payment for goods and services. There is of course, a large literature on
the optimal taxation of fiat money, the so-called inflation tax literature. This literature
focuses on conditions for the zero taxation of cash, i.e. the Friedman rule, which says
that the nominal interest rate should be zero. In this literature, however, it is assumed,
without exception, that cash is the only medium of payment, or that some goods can
be bought on credit, and so the issue of how services provided by the banking system
should be taxed is not addressed.1
This focus on cash may have been justified years ago, when the use of a bank
account meant the writing of a check, and most transactions were made using cash.
However, the focus on the literature on cash is clearly increasingly unrealistic because
technological advances have allowed so-called electronic transfer of funds at the point
of sale, by using credit and debit cards. These services are rapidly overtaking cash as
means of payment for retail transactions.2
For example, based on a large-scale payment diary survey, conducted between 2009
and 2012 in seven major countries, Bagnall et al. (2016) report that the share of the
number of transactions with cash is on average of 62% (between 46 and 82%, varying
by country), while its value share is on average of 35% (between 15 and 65%).3 As
expected, this shows that a larger number of smaller transactions are made by cash,
and that larger value transactions are made by other means. In recent years, the share of
cash has fallen further. For example, in the US, the share of cash in retail transactions
fell from 40% in 2012 to 32% in 2015 (Matheny et al. 2016).
On the other hand, it is unlikely that cash will disappear altogether as a medium of
payment; as reported by the Cash Product Office of the US Federal Reserve, “In 2015,
cash continued to dominate small-value transactions, with cash being used for more
than 50% of transactions under $25....(and) for more than 60% of purchases under
$10.” (Matheny et al. 2016, p6). Again, in another large scale payment diary survey in
the Euro Area in 2016, for a subset of EU countries, Esselink and Hernández (2017)
report an even higher ratio of cash usage than Bagnall et al. (2016), for countries such
as Cyprus, Greece, and Malta, which used above 70% cash by transactions value.
1 See for example, Correia and Teles (1996, 1999) which consider a transactions cost theory of money
demand, or Chari et al. (1991, 1996), where some goods can be bought on costless credit. More recent
models include a more micro-founded search theoretic demand for fiat money e.g. Aruoba and Chugh
(2010), but existing models of this type do not include a banking sector. The literature is surveyed in
Kocherlakota (2005) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010).
2 As a result of these trends, the provision of payment services is an increasing source of both activity
and profit for banks and payment network operators, such as VISA and Mastercard. For example, in the
United States, the fee averages approximately 2% of transaction value. This is giving rise to large and
growing revenues and profits for both banks and the operators. For example, DeYoung and Rice (2004)
estimate that in the US in 2003, non-interest income accounted for half of all bank income, and 52% of
non-interest income was generated by fees associated with payment accounts. Visa, the largest payment
network operator, had gross income and profit of $18.36 bln. and $11.69 bln. in the 2017 financial year.
3 The countries were Austria, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, The Netherlands, USA.
123
How should payment services be taxed?
Does the choice of payment method matter? At a macroeconomic level, Philippon
(2015) and Bazot (2018), show that the costs of financial intermediation for the banking
sector in the US and Europe are considerable; for the US, they estimate these costs at
around 2.5% of assets intermediated. The specific costs of operating payments services
such as Mastercard, Visa etc are also large; for example a 2012 study by the European
Central Bank estimated the average resource cost of non-cash payment systems across
EU-27 at about 1% of GDP (Schmiedel et al. 2012). This translates to about 2.8% of
the value of consumption facilitated by payments systems.4 But, these costs have to
be set against the benefits to consumers in terms of greater time saving, convenience,
and security.
Given these two methods of payment for goods, the question then arises as to how
they should be taxed, if a government has to use distortionary taxes to raise revenue.
This paper studies the optimal tax structure in a model that combines the transaction
cost theory of the demand for money (for example Correia and Teles (1996), Teles
(2003)), with the model of Freeman and Kydland (2000), which allows for substitution
between cash and use of bank accounts. In our model, the household demands different
varieties of goods in different quantities, and these can be paid for either by cash, or
by electronic transfer of funds at the point of sale, provided by a bank account. We
will call this account a payment account (PA).5
The time transactions cost of using cash is modeled in the usual way, by assuming
that goods bought with cash require a time input from the household, which can be
lowered by holding a higher stock of real money balances.
We model the cost of using a PA by assuming that the bank charges a per transaction
fee to the seller of the good, which is then passed on to the consumer by the seller.6
To make our point as clearly as possible, we assume the use of the PA requires no
time input from the household. While this is an abstraction, it is increasingly close to
reality, with so-called ”contactless” payment via debit card, and mobile phone apps
for management of bank accounts becoming increasingly widespread.
To ensure that the choice between cash and a PA is not trivial, we assume that cash
has a real resource cost, as in Correia and Teles (1996). The reason for this is that if
cash were free, the optimal inflation tax would be zero, and then the household would
use only cash.7 We then show that in equilibrium, there will be a ”switch point” above
which varieties in greater demand will be bought using the PA.
The government has a fixed revenue requirement in each period, and to finance this,
can tax the payment fees charged by banks, and can also tax real money balances via
an inflation tax. In addition, the government has the use of a consumption or income
tax. In this setting, we characterize optimal payment service taxes i.e. the structure
of taxes on both real money balances and the fees, as well as the consumption tax.
4 On average, in the EU, consumption is about 70% of GDP. Also, as a rough approximation, about 50%
of total transactions are non-cash. So, the percentage is 1%/(0.7 × 0.5)=2.8%.
5 So, a payment account is what is known as a checking account in the USA, and a current account in the
UK.
6 These fees are known as merchant discount fees. The bulk of this is made up of a change for card use by
the card-issuing bank, known as the interchange fee, and the reminder of the merchant discount fee goes to
the card company and the acquiring bank.
7 This is discussed formally in Sect. 3.4.
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Our main contribution is to develop simple formulae for the optimal ad valorem taxes
on both real money balances and transactions fees. It turns out that the structure of
taxes on these two payment methods only depend on the characteristics of the time
transactions cost of cash, not the form of the household utility function.
Specifically, in our setting, the time used for transactions is a function of the quantity
of goods bought with cash (cash purchases), and real money balances. Then, both the
sign of each tax, and the ratio of these two taxes, depend only on the properties of the
time transactions cost function. Assuming that this function is homogeneous of degree
k, both taxes are decreasing in k. The tax on cash is also increasing in elasticity of the
marginal time transactions cost of additional cash purchases with respect to real money
balances. Similarly, the tax on fees is also increasing in elasticity of the marginal time
transactions cost of additional cash purchases with respect to cash purchases. If k ≤ 1,
the tax on real money balances is always positive, but the tax on fees may be negative.
We also find conditions on the time transactions cost of cash such that the taxes are
positive, and that the tax on cash is always higher than the tax on fees.
The general intuition for these results is based on the concept of a “virtual” time
endowment. Specifically, we can reduce the tax design problem for the government
to a completely standard one, except that the household has, instead of a fixed time
endowment, a “virtual” time endowment that is endogenous, and depends on k and the
share of goods bought with cash and real money balances. This virtual time endowment
is of course not directly taxable, but can be indirectly taxed by taxes on payment
services insofar as they affect the share of goods bought with cash and real money
balances. For example, a tax will be positive if it indirectly reduces the virtual time
endowment. Thus, in general terms, the intuition is similar to that of Corlett and
Hague (1953), who argue that taxes should be set to indirectly tax non-taxable leisure.
However, the specific mechanism is quite different; in Corlett and Hague (1953), the
key variable is the degree of complementarity in preferences between leisure and the
taxed goods. Here, it is the properties of the transactions technology that are key.
We also relate our results to the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency
result. One can interpret the transactions technology in our model as a form of house-
hold production, where inputs in the form of cash balances and PAs, combined with
market purchases and time, produce final consumption. Our result is that even with a
constant returns transactions time technology, these inputs to final consumption should
generally be taxed. In other words, the Diamond–Mirrlees principle that inputs should
not be taxed with constant returns in production does not extend to the household in
this context.
Our results also have implications for the literature on the optimal inflation tax.
For example, we show that the findings of Correia and Teles (1996) are not robust to
introducing substitutability between cash and PAs.8 Specifically, we show that when
both payment media are used, real money balances should be taxed even when k = 1,
in contrast to their findings when cash is the only medium of payment.9
8 The Correia-Teles model is a special case of ours, as explained in Sect. 3.5
9 The work of Correia and Teles (1996) has already shown, however, that in an environment where only cash
is used for transactions, such an efficiency result (i.e. a zero inflation tax) requires the additional condition
that the transactions technology for cash must be constant returns to scale. The intuition is that if (say) the
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We then turn to some numerical simulations, using a calibrated version of the model.
We find that, consistently with our analytical results, both the inflation tax and the tax
on fees decrease markedly as the returns to scale in transactions costs increase from
zero to one. The results show also that both inflation tax and the tax on fees decrease
as the bank fee increases. This is interesting as the move away from cash that we
currently observe is ultimately driven by technological innovation that reduces fees.
Moreover, when the fee is large or when returns to scale are close to one, the tax on
fees can be negative i.e. bank fees should be subsidized. We also find that the tax on
bank fees can be greater or less than the rate of consumption tax although both taxes
are of the same order of magnitude.
Our findings have some implications for the current policy debate on the taxation
of banks, especially in Europe, where it is the view of many, including the European
Commission, that banks are under-taxed, because many of their services are exempt
from VAT.10 In this debate, it is largely assumed that within a consumption tax system,
such as a VAT, it is desirable to tax financial services at the standard rate of VAT e.g.
Ebrill et al. (2001).11 Our results provide some support for this position, in that we
find that payment services provided by banks should be taxed positively in a number
of cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of
related literature. Sections 3–5 outline the model. Section 6 presents the main results.
Section 7 presents a calibrated version of the model, and Sect. 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper relates to a number of literatures. First, there is a small literature directly
addressing the taxation of payment services (Grubert and Mackie 2000; Jack 2000;
Auerbach and Gordon 2002). With the exception of Auerbach and Gordon (2002),
these papers use a simple two-period consumption-savings model without an explicit
production sector, and assume that payment services are consumed in fixed proportion
to aggregate consumption.12 In this setting, it is straightforward to show that if there
is a pre-existing consumption tax at the same rate in both periods, the marginal rate
of substitution between present and future consumption is left unchanged if payment
services are taxed at the same rate as consumption.
Footnote 9 continued
transactions technology is decreasing returns, this creates a ”virtual profit” for the household which can
be taxed via a positive inflation tax. This is, of course, analogous to the original Diamond–Mirrlees result,
which states that inputs to production should be untaxed as long as there are constant returns to scale (or
100% profit taxation), but taxed if there are decreasing returns to scale (Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971).
10 Currently, within European Union countries, most financial intermediation services are exempt from
VAT, notably financial services which are not explicitly priced (De La Feria and Lockwood 2010; PWC
2011; Buettner and Erbe 2014).
11 See also the recent IMF proposals for a Financial Activities Tax levied on bank profits and remuneration,
one version of which - FAT1 - would work very much like a VAT (IMF 2010).
12 Chia and Whalley (1999), using a computational approach, reach the rather different conclusion that no
intermediation services should be taxed, but their model is not directly comparable to these others, as the
intermediation costs are assumed to be proportional to the price of the goods being transacted.
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Auerbach and Gordon (2002) consider a multi-period life-cycle model of the con-
sumer where purchase of goods requires payment services, which themselves are
produced using other inputs. Payment services are assumed to be demanded in strict
proportion to consumption. They show that if there is initially only a labor income tax
imposed on the household, then this is equivalent to a value-added tax if and only if
the payment services consumed by the household are taxed at the same rate as other
goods.13
There are, however, a number of restrictive assumptions implicit in these existing
models. First, and foremost, they do not allow the household to choose between cash
and other payment services. Second, other taxes are assumed fixed, not optimized,
and it is implicit that the existing taxes are non-distortionary, because the analysis
proceeds by finding conditions under which taxation of payment services does not
introduce any further distortions. By contrast, we take an explicit tax design approach
to the question, investigating the second-best tax structure.
The second related literature is on the optimal inflation tax. This literature is mature,
and there are a number of well-known reasons why the Friedman rule may not hold
and it may be optimal to tax real money balances. These include the existence of pure
profit due to decreasing returns to scale, imperfect competition in the product market,
or tax evasion (see for example, the surveys by Kocherlakota 2005; Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe 2010). Our model has none of these features, but we still find violation of
the Friedman rule, for completely different reasons. Moreover, in spite of the large
literature on the Friedman rule, we are not aware of any paper that studies the optimal
tax structure on both cash and non-cash payment instruments.
A third related literature is the one on optimal taxation with household production
(Sandmo 1990; Piggott and Whalley 2001; Kleven et al. 2000). This literature has a
number of similarities to ours. Specifically, the complementarity of purchased inputs
and household time in household production is an important determinant of the optimal
tax structure, and also, there is generally production inefficiency; that is, taxes distort
the choice of inputs to household production. The relationship of our results to theirs
is further discussed in Sect. 6 below.
Finally, there is a recent literature studying banks that engage in socially undesirable
activities such as excessive risk-taking.14 The main finding is that these should be
corrected by Pigouvian taxes (or regulations) that apply directly to these decision
margins, such as taxes on borrowing or lending. Our work is distinct from this line of
inquiry, as the banking sector has no external effects in our setting; we are concerned
with the design of taxes to raise revenue. So, we are studying ”boring banks” in the
terminology of Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015), to which our paper is also related. They,
however, focus on tax incidence issues, whereas we are concerned with tax design.
13 In particular, they show that if there is initially a wage income tax at rate τ, which is replaced by a
consumption tax at equivalent rate τ/(1 − τ), then the real equilibrium is left unchanged if and only if
payment services are also taxed at this equivalent rate.
14 See e.g. Acharya et al. (2017), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Keen (2011),
Perotti and Suarez (2011) Keen (2011).
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3 Themodel
The model is a modified version of the Freeman and Kydland (2000) model. This
model has a number of attractive features which generates an equilibrium where cash
and PAs co-exist, and where small items will be purchased with cash and larger items
will be purchased with PAs. These are: (i) the consumption bundle is sorted by the
sizes of the purchases, (ii) there is a time cost of using cash, and (iii) there is a fixed cost
per transaction of using the PA. All these features are needed for a non-trivial analysis
of the effects of payment services taxes on household behavior. The exact relationship
of our set-up to Freeman and Kydland (2000) is discussed further in Sect. 3.5 below.
3.1 Set-up
A large number of identical households live for periods t = 1, . . .∞. In each period,
they consume a number of different varieties of a consumption good j ∈ [0, 1], supply
labor, and can also hold cash, bank deposits and government bonds. The banks take
deposits and use them to buy government bonds, and also provide payment services
to depositors. The government issues bonds and sets taxes to finance an exogenous
level of public good provision in each period.
3.2 Firms and banks
In each period, a single competitive firm produces an intermediate good from labor,
where one unit of labor produces one unit of the good. One unit of this intermediate
good can be transformed by a seller j into one unit of variety j ∈ [0, 1] of the
consumption good. All sellers are perfectly competitive price takers and thus set a
price of variety j equal to the price of the intermediate good.
A single competitive bank offers a PA to the households. It takes nominal deposits
Dt from the household in period t , and purchases government bonds B Bt . The bank
also provides payment services, using the intermediate good as an input. Specifically,
any variety j can be purchased using the PA at a cost of f per purchase in units of the
intermediate good. As the bank is competitive, we assume that the cost is just passed
on to the household, without any mark-up.
This fee can be taxed at rate τ ft so the household faces a cost f
(
1 + τ ft
)
if it chooses
to purchase variety j using a PA. We interpret f as covering all costs associated with
the banking system. So, f measures, inter alia, the costs of physical bank branches,
and all labor and other costs associated with PAs. Included in this would be the bank
interchange fee that a card-issuing bank charges the seller of the good for the use of
the card.15
15 In practice, the bank interchange fee is a fixed charge f , plus a percentage of the value of the transaction.
For example, in the US, Visa currently charges either $0.15 plus 0.80% or $0.21 plus 0.05% for debit card
retail transactions, depending on whether the bank is exempt (small) or regulated (large, over $10 billion in
assets). This second percentage cost element could be introduced without changing any of the qualitative
results.
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Finally, the stock of bonds outstanding at t pay a nominal interest rate it . As the
bank is perfectly competitive, this is also the return on deposits.
3.3 Households
The single infinitely lived household has preferences over levels of consumption goods
and leisure t = 0, ..∞ of the form:
∞∑
t=0
β t u (ct , lt ) , ct = minj∈[0,1] {ct ( j) /2 j} , (1)
where ct ( j) is the level of consumption of variety j in period t, lt is the consumption of
leisure. We assume u (c, l) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and that ucl ≥ 0,
where subscripts denote derivatives. Also, 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor.
The fixed coefficients specification for the commodity index follows Freeman and
Kydland (2000); it allows for consumption levels of the different varieties to vary
in an analytically tractable way. In particular, all varieties will be consumed in fixed
proportions to some c, i.e.
c ( j) = 2cj, j ∈ [0, 1] . (2)
Note that aggregate consumption is
∫ 1
0 c ( j) d j = c.
The household can use either cash or the PA to make purchases. The advantage of
using the PA is that relative to cash, it economizes on household time. To make this
point as cleanly as possible, we assume that use of the PA requires no time. This is an
increasingly close approximation to reality, as many card transactions are contactless
(i.e. do not even require a security (PIN) number) and accounts can be managed via
smart-phone apps. On the other hand, using cash is costly in terms of time, for several
reasons that are well-documented in the literature; it has to be physically withdrawn
from ATMs, stored securely, etc.
We capture this by supposing that a volume x ≡ 2c ∫T jd j of consumption bought
with cash requires s (x, m) units of time, where T ⊂ [0, 1] is the subset of goods that
are bought with cash, and m is real money balances, defined below. We assume that
s is twice continuously differentiable, increasing in x and decreasing in m. We will
also assume that an increase in the use of money reduces the marginal transactions
cost i.e. sxm < 0. This general specification s (x, m) of the time transactions cost
of cash is standard in the literature, and includes a number of well-known special
cases. For example, with the inventory-theoretic demand for money of Baumol and
Tobin, s has the interpretation of the time cost of the number of trips to the bank, so
s = α x
m
, where α is the time cost per trip, and x
m
is the number of trips. A rather
different specification is used in the more recent literature on the optimal inflation
tax; for example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) assume s = σ ( x
m
)
x , where σ(.)
is strictly increasing.
Now note that given a level c of aggregate consumption, a switch from cash to
a PA as a payment instrument for variety j has a financial cost for the consumer
of f (1 + τ f ), and a time saving of ∂s
∂ j = sx 2cj , where here and in what follows,
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subscripts denote partial derivatives, so that for example sx = ∂s∂x . At the household
optimum, because the wage is unity, both are measured in the same units, so the net cost
is f (1 + τ f ) − sx 2cj . It is immediate that the net cost of using the PA is decreasing
in j, so in any period t, there will be a critical index j∗t such that all goods j < j∗t
are bought with cash, and all goods j > j∗t are bought with the PA. This is consistent
with what is observed in practice, where cash is used for small transactions, and PAs
for larger transactions.16
So, xt , the volume of goods bought with cash, is
xt = 2
∫ j∗t
0
ct jd j =
( j∗t
)2
ct . (3)
Finally, following Correia and Teles (1996) and Teles (2003), to get mt , we deflate
nominal money holdings by the period t price level Pt , inclusive of the consumption
tax τ ct i.e.
mt = MtPt
(
1 + τ ct
) .
This captures the idea that nominal money balances are needed to pay for goods where
the price includes the tax τ ct .
In each period, the household consumes goods and leisure, and can accumulate
bonds, cash, or deposits in the PA. So, the per period budget constraint is
Pt ct
(
1 + τ ct
) + Pt
(
1 − j∗t
) f
(
1 + τ ft
)
+ Mt+1 + Dt+1 + B Ht+1
= Pt ht + Mt + (1 + it )
(
B Ht + Dt
)
, t = 1, 2, ... (4)
Note that
(
1 − j∗t
) f
(
1 + τ ft
)
is the overall cost in consumption units of using a PA
for varieties j ≥ j∗t . Here, labor supply ht to the intermediate good sector is the time
endowment minus leisure and the time transactions cost i.e.,
ht = 1 − lt − st . (5)
Also, here, Dt , B Ht are holdings of deposits and bonds at time t . Finally, following
Chari et al. (1996), we assume that M0 = D0 = B H0 = 0; if these initial conditions
do not hold, then the government’s problem is trivial.17
16 For example, using a sample of Dutch retailers, ten Raa and Shestalova (2004) estimate that the point at
which households switch from cash to electronic payment media is somewhere between 13 and 30 Euros.
More recently Wang and Wolman (2016) find similar switching thresholds for a large data-set for the US.
17 As is well-known, if the initial stock M0 + D0 + B H0 of nominal assets is positive (negative), then
welfare is maximized by setting the initial price level to infinity (or sufficiently low). See Chari et al. (1996,
p207).
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3.4 Government
The government chooses a sequences of expenditures, taxes, and nominal interest
rates
{
gt , τ ct , τ
f
t , it
}∞
t=1 to maximize the utility of the representative household (1),
subject to the government budget constraint and optimization decisions by households,
firms, and banks. Implicit in the choice of the nominal interest rate is a choice of ad
valorem tax on real money balances. Moreover, to ensure that the choice between cash
and a PA is not trivial, we assume that cash has a real resource cost, as in Correia
and Teles (1996). If fiat money were free, the optimal tax on real money balances
is zero, and then the household would not use a PA.18 Specifically, we assume that
there is a strictly positive per unit resource cost of real money balances, γ > 0. As
we show below, the price facing the household for the use of real money balances is
it
(
1 + τ ct
)
. The cost to the government of providing a unit of real money balances is
γ . So, the implicit ad valorem tax τmt on real money balances is defined by the identity
it
(
1 + τ ct
) = γ (1 + τmt ). So, effectively, the government sets a tax on real money
balances as follows:
τmt =
it
(
1 + τ ct
)
γ
− 1. (6)
Note that because it is also a government policy instrument, τmt and τ ct are set sepa-
rately.
Also note that given all the other tax instruments, a wage income tax is redundant
for the government. This is because as is well-known in public finance, a wage income
tax is equivalent to uniform consumption tax on all goods (Atkinson and Stiglitz 2015,
p309), and here, we effectively only have one good, as all varieties are consumed in
fixed proportions. Unlike many papers, which drop a consumption tax to eliminate
the redundancy (e.g. Atkeson et al. 1999), we retain the consumption tax because we
want to be able to compare the consumption tax to the tax on fees.
As is standard in the literature, we solve the government’s tax design problem using
the primal approach, as described in more detail in Sect. 5 below. In this approach,
we allow the government to choose all the variables {lt , ct , mt , j∗t }∞t=1 to maximize
household utility subject to aggregate resource implementation constraints; the latter
ensures that government choices can be decentralized. Once we have characterized
the solution to this problem, we can “back out” the time path for the government’s
actual policy variables i.e. the taxes on fees and consumption, τ ft , τ ct and the nominal
interest rate it .
18 A formal proof of this point is as follows. Assume for convenience following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2010), that s = σ ( cm
)
c, and that there is a finite value of velocity v = cm , v¯ such that the household is
satiated i.e. σ ′ (v¯) = 0. Then, if real balances are untaxed, from (11) below, the household will use real
money balances up to the point where smt = 0 or mt = v¯ct , which in turn implies from (A.6) below, that
emt = 0 as long as j∗t = 1. But, if emt = γ = 0, then from (21) below, it is optimal to have smt = 0,
completing the argument.
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3.5 Discussion
Our model is closely related to Freeman and Kydland (2000), and also Henriksen and
Kydland (2010) and Lucas and Nicolini (2015), which build on the original Freeman-
Kydland model. These models are, however, somewhat more complex as they are
designed to be calibrated to macroeconomic aggregates. The model of Freeman and
Kydland (2000) is used to explain certain correlations in the data, such as the positive
correlation of Ml and the deposit-to-currency ratio with real output.19 The model of
Henriksen and Kydland (2010) does analyze quantitatively the welfare cost of inflation
and compares it to the welfare cost of a labor tax, and so it is closer in spirit to what
we do here, but it does not analyze the optimal tax problem analytically.
In more detail, start from the model of Henriksen and Kydland (2010). Then, if
we drop capital as a factor of production, introduce government bonds as a store of
value, and set the reserve ratio for the banking system equal to zero, we arrive at a
model that is very close to the one of this paper. We think that these simplifications
are appropriate because our objective is to characterize optimal taxes, not explain
macroeconomic aggregates.
However, a major difference is that we model transactions costs somewhat differ-
ently. In Henriksen and Kydland (2010), the transactions cost s is interpreted as the
number of trips the household makes to the asset market, or a savings account. On
each trip, the household can sell capital and thus replenish its stocks of both fiat money
and deposits. This seems to us a somewhat old-fashioned way of thinking about time
transactions costs. As already mentioned, a key feature of electronic banking is that
the time cost of moving money from (say) a savings account to the PA is very low
and we in fact set that cost to zero. Rather, s in our model is the cost of obtaining and
managing cash e.g. trips to ATMs, guarding against theft, etc.
Finally, if we assume that only fiat money can be used for purchases, i.e. if we
impose j∗ ≡ 1, our model reduces to the model of Correia and Teles (1996) or Teles
(2003). So, our results can be interpreted as generalizations of theirs.
4 Household behavior
In this section, we characterize household behavior, given a fixed sequence of taxes
and government expenditures. We can write (4) in real terms as
ct
(
1 + τ ct
) + (1 − j∗t ) f
(
1 + τ ft
)
+ (1 + πt+1)
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
mt+1 + (1 + πt+1)
(
dt+1 + bHt+1
)
= ht + mt
(
1 + τ ct
) + (1 + it )
(
dt + bHt
)
, t = 1, 2, ..., (7)
19 Lucas and Nicolini (2015) extends the model of Freeman and Kydland (2000) to allow for different
types of payment accounts, and uses it to analyze regulatory changes in the US.
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where πt+1 = Pt+1Pt − 1 is the rate of inflation. Substituting out dt + bHt in (7), and
using (5), we obtain the present-value budget constraint:
∞∑
t=0
χt
(
ct
(
1 + τ ct
) + (1 − j∗t
) f
(
1 + τ ft
)
+ it
(
1 + τ ct
)
mt
)
=
∞∑
t=0
χt
(
1 − lt − s
(( j∗t
)2
ct , mt
))
, (8)
where χt = ∏tj=1 1Rt , and Rt = 1+it1+πt . We can make two remarks at this point,. First,
as deposits are perfect substitutes for bonds, the choice of dt by the household is inde-
terminate. Second, as is standard, the opportunity cost of holding real money balances
is the nominal interest forgone i.e. it ; the complication here is that the opportunity
cost is also scaled by 1 + τ ct because one unit of consumption costs 1 + τ ct from (7).
The household then maximizes (1) subject to (8). To write the first-order conditions
compactly, we will use the notation uct for the derivative of u(ct , lt ) with respect to
ct , with second and cross-derivatives being denoted ucct , uclt and so on.20 Using this
notation, we can write the first-order conditions for choice of ct , lt , mt , j∗t respectively
as:
β t uct = λχt
(
1 + τ ct +
( j∗t
)2
sxt
)
, (9)
β t ult = λχt , (10)
it
(
1 + τ ct
) = −smt , (11)
f
(
1 + τ ft
)
= sxt 2ct j∗t , (12)
where λ is the multiplier on (8) and where it is understood that sxt is the derivative with
respect to xt =
( j∗t
)2
ct from (3). Note from (11), the household holds real money
balances up to the point where the cost, it
(
1 + τ ct
)
, is equal to the marginal reduction
in transactions time, −smt . So, as Teles (2003) observes, the true cost of money to the
household is not it , but it
(
1 + τ ct
)
, reflecting the fact that money is implicitly subject
to the consumption tax, because of the need to use money to pay the consumption tax.
Similarly, (12) says that the household uses payment services up to the point where the
per transaction cost of doing so, f
(
1 + τ ft
)
, is equal to time transaction cost saving
sxt 2ct j∗t .
Finally, a note on the second-order conditions. Given strict quasi-concavity of the
utility function in ct , lt , and by inspection of (8), we just need s
(
( j∗)2 c, m
)
to be con-
vex in c, m, and j∗. It is tedious but straightforward to check that sufficient conditions
for this are simply that s is convex in its arguments x, m.21
20 So, the “t” denotes the time at which the derivative is taken, not the derivative with respect to t, which
of course is not even defined, as time is discrete.
21 This is satisfied in the Baumol-Tobin case, for example as sxx = 0, smm = αx
m3
> 0, smx = − α
m2
,
which implies sxx smm ≤ (smx )2 .
123
How should payment services be taxed?
5 The tax design problem for the government
As already remarked, we solve the government’s tax design problem using the primal
approach. In this approach, we allow the government to choose the quantity variables{
lt , ct , mt , j∗t
}∞
t=1 to maximize household utility (1) subject to the resource constraint
and the implementation constraint, which ensures that government choices can be
decentralized. Once we have characterized the solution to this problem, we can “back
out” the time path for the government’s actual policy variables i.e. the taxes on fees,
real money balances, and consumption,
{
τ
f
t , τ
m
t , τ
c
t
}∞
t=1.
The resource constraint simply says that the output of the intermediate good, 1 −
lt − st , is no smaller than the demand for that good. Following Correia and Teles
(1996), we assume that in each period, there is an exogenous level of public good
provision gt . The intermediate good also produces the final consumption good ct ,
and must also cover the real resource cost the banking system,
(
1 − j∗t
) f , and of real
money balances, γ mt . So, the resource constraint can be written as
ct + γ mt +
(
1 − j∗t
) f + gt ≤ 1 − lt − st (13)
The implementation constraint is obtained by substituting the household first-order
conditions into the present value budget constraint. Substituting (9), (12) into (8), and
rearranging, we get (see “Appendix”):
∞∑
t=0
β t
(
ct uct + ult
(
st − xt sxt − mt smt + sxt 2ct j∗t
(
1 − j∗t
) + lt − 1
)) = 0. (14)
This derivation shows that (14) is necessary for an allocation {ct , lt , mt , j∗t
}∞
t=0 to be
decentralizable; following standard arguments in the literature, it is also possible to
prove that (14) is sufficient.
To interpret (14), we can rewrite the implementation constraint more compactly as,
∞∑
t=0
β t (ct uct − ult (et − lt )) = 0, (15)
where
et = xt sxt + mt smt − st − sxt 2ct j∗t
(
1 − j∗t
) + 1. (16)
Now, the key observation is that (15) is the implementation constraint of a standard
dynamic tax problem where et is an endowment of time in period t . So, we will refer
to et as the virtual time endowment, and note that it is generally affected by choices
of ct , mt , j∗t . Note also that mt , j∗t only enter the tax design problem via et and the
resource constraint. We assume from now on that s is homogeneous of degree k in
x, m, and so by Euler’s theorem, we can write,22
et = (k − 1) st − sxt 2ct j∗t
(
1 − j∗t
) + 1. (17)
22 Specifically, xt sxt + mt smt = kst .
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As is standard in the primal approach to tax design, we can incorporate the imple-
mentability constraint (15) into the government’s maximand by writing an effective
objective for the government of
Wt (ct , lt , et ) = u (ct , lt ) + μ (uct ct − ult (et − lt )) , (18)
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier on (15).
So, to summarize, the tax design problem for the government is the choice of{
ct , lt , mt , j∗t
}∞
t=0 to maximize
∑∞
t=0 β t Wt subject to (13), the usual non-negativity
constraints on {ct , lt , mt , st } , and also that j∗t ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the non-
negativity constraints are non-binding, but we will be interested also in the case where
j∗t = 1 i.e. where only cash is used, as this relates to the existing literature.
6 Results
6.1 First-order conditions for the government’s problem
First, we write down the first-order conditions for the government’s tax design problem.
Assuming 0 < j∗t < 1 at the optimum, the first-order conditions are the following:
Wct − ξt
(
1 + ( j∗t
)2
sxt
)
= 0, (19)
Wlt − ξt = 0, (20)
−μult emt − ξt (smt + γ ) = 0, (21)
−μult e j t + ξt
( f − sxt 2ct j∗t
) = 0, (22)
where β tξt is the Lagrange multiplier on the period t resource constraint.23 Here,
e jt denotes the derivative of et with respect to j∗t , and emt denotes the derivative
of et with respect to mt . In what follows, we will assume that the multiplier on the
implementability constraint is strictly positive i.e. μ > 0. To see the economic meaning
of this, note first that
Wlt = ult + μ (uclt c − ullt (et − lt ) + ult ) . (23)
Note that in calculating (23), we use the fact that et is independent of lt . Then, com-
bining (20) and (23), we get, after some manipulation:
μ = ξt − ult
ult
1
1 + Hlt , Hlt =
uclt ct − ullt (et − lt )
ult
. (24)
Here, ξt−ult
ξt
is the value of one unit of labor to the government, relative to its value
to the household, and thus measures the social gain from additional taxation at the
23 This specification of the Lagrange multiplier just ensures that ξt is time-invariant in the steady state and
is thus just made to simplify the presentation.
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margin. We will assume that this is positive; if it is negative or zero, there is no need
for distortionary taxation. Also, as uclt ≥ 0 is assumed, 1+ Hlt ≥ 0 as long as et ≥ lt .
But from (17), et ≥ lt as long as s is not “too large”. Given that estimated transactions
costs in practice are a very small share of total available time (see Sect. 7 below), this
seems a reasonable assumption to make.
6.2 Optimal payment service taxes
The first-order conditions for the government’s tax design problem can be combined
with the household’s first-order conditions to “back out” intuitive formulae for the
optimal taxes. This Proposition is proved in the “Appendix”.
Proposition 1 If 0 < j∗t < 1 at the optimum, then the optimal payment service taxes
are
τ
f
t
1 + τ ft
= Z
(
1 − k + 1 − 2 j
∗
t
j∗t
+ 2εxt 1 − j
∗
t
j∗t
)
, εxt = sxxt x t
sxt
≥ 0, (25)
τmt
1 + τmt
= Z
(
1 − k + 2εmt 1 − j
∗
t
j∗t
)
, εmt = sxmt xt
smt
> 0, (26)
where Z = μult
ξt
> 0.
So, we see that both taxes take a similar form; there is a term in 1 − k, where k is
the returns to scale in the transactions cost function, and then a term in the elasticity
of the marginal time transactions cost of additional cash purchases with respect to x ,
εxt (for fees), or with respect to m, εmt (for cash). In particular, the taxes are both
decreasing in k and increasing in the elasticities.
We can develop some intuition for this as follows. The general principle is that
the household has a virtual time endowment et , which is untaxable directly. But, it is
taxable indirectly via choice of payment services taxes. Thus, a tax will be positive if
it indirectly reduces the virtual time endowment via its impact on household choices
of mt , j∗t . Thus, in general terms, the intuition is similar to that of Corlett and Hague
(1953), that taxes should be set to indirectly tax untaxable leisure. However, the specific
mechanisms are quite different; in Corlett and Hague, the key variable is the degree
of complementarity in preferences between leisure and the taxed goods. Here, it is the
properties of the transactions technology that are key.
Specifically, consider first an increase in τmt . This will decrease the use of cash
balances m by the household. In turn, by inspection of (17), this decrease in m has two
effects on et . First, as s is decreasing in m, an increase τmt decreases the virtual labor
endowment if k < 1. In this case, the tax will be positive. This explains the term in
1 − k in (26). A second effect is that as sxm < 0, the decrease in m increases sx and
thus reduces et . This explains the second positive term in εmt in (26).
Next, consider an increase in τ ft . This will decrease the use of the PA by the
households i.e. increase j∗, which raises x . In turn, by inspection of (17), this increase
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in x has three effects on et . First, as s is increasing in x , an increase τ ft decreases the
virtual labor endowment if k < 1. In this case, the tax will be positive. This explains
the term in 1− k in (25). A second effect is that as sxx > 0, the increase in x increases
sx and thus reduces et . This explains the positive term in εxt in (25). A final effect is
that an increase in j∗has an ambiguous effect on j∗t
(
1 − j∗t
)
, and thus et , in (17); it
increases (decreases) it if j∗t < 0.5 ( j∗t > 0.5). This explains the middle term in (25).
What can we say about the signs and relative sizes of the taxes? Note first from
(26) that as long as k ≤ 1, τmt > 0 i.e. the inflation tax is positive. But, we cannot be
sure that the tax on fees will be positive, due to the second term 1−2 j
∗
t
j∗t which can be
negative, and indeed, we will shortly see that this is a possibility.
To get further results on the relative size of the payment taxes, we assume the
special case where s = α xk+1
m
. If k = 0, this is the Baumol-Tobin specification of s. If
k = 1, it is a special case of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) specification σ ( x
m
)
x .
With this specification of s, it is easily calculated that εxt = k, εmt = k + 1 and as a
consequence, we can show:
Proposition 2 If 0 < j∗t < 1 at the optimum, and s = α x
k+1
m
, then τ ft < τmt i.e. fees
should be taxed at a lower rate than cash. Also, τ ft > 0 iff j∗t < 1+2k1+3k , and τmt > 0
iff j∗t < 2+2k1+3k .
So, we see that in this special case, both taxes are positive if the fraction of goods
purchased with cash, j∗t , is small relative to k. For particular values of k, we can say
more. In the Baumol–Tobin case, where k = 0, we see immediately that we always
have τmt , τ
f
t > 0, irrespective of j∗t . If k = 1, then the condition for τmt > 0 always
holds, and τ ft > 0 if and only if j∗t < 34 , but if j∗t > 34 , fees should be subsidized.
The conditions for non-negative taxes of course follow fairly directly from (25), (26)
as k appears negatively in both (25), (26), and j∗t appears positively in (26) and also
in (25) if j∗t < 0.5.
We conclude by linking our results to two important existing literatures on opti-
mal tax. The first is the classic Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) result on production
efficiency. To proceed, note that in our model, there is a special kind of household
production technology, where aggregate consumption c is “produced” from purchases
of individual varieties c(i) plus a time input s, real money balances m, and fees
f (1 − j∗). So, following the literature on household production, it is of interest to
know when there is production efficiency for the household in the Diamond–Mirrlees
sense, i.e. when inputs to aggregate consumption are untaxed. As the time input s is
untaxable by definition, production efficiency requires that the taxes on money and
fees will be zero. But, from Proposition 2, we see that as long as k ≤ 1, τmt > 0 i.e.
the inflation tax is positive. So, we can state:
Proposition 3 If 0 < j∗t < 1 at the optimum, then there is never production efficiency
for the household i.e. the use of cash and PAs is always distorted by the tax system if
k ≤ 1.
We can make two observations at this point. First, the Diamond–Mirrlees result
says that a sufficient condition for production efficiency is constant returns to scale
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in production. Here, the analogous assumption, i.e. constant returns in s(x, m) i.e.
k = 1 is not sufficient. For example, from (26), if k = 1, τmt = 0 additionally requires
sxmt = 0, and the latter does not hold for any of the specifications of the transactions
cost function s considered in the literature. So, in this setting, the Diamond–Mirrlees
result does not carry over in a simple way to household production.
Second, Proposition 3 is related to the literature on household production, which
finds that the optimal tax structure should generally distort the use of inputs in house-
hold production, as we do. For example, Sandmo (1990) shows that in a simple model
where the final consumption can be produced from household time and a produced
input, the household input should generally be taxed. The paper by Kleven et al. (2000),
which extends Sandmo’s analysis, finds similar results.
The second literature that we wish to link to is the existing literature on the optimal
inflation tax. In that literature, cash is the only medium of exchange, so we assume
that at the optimum, j∗t = 1. This might be because the cost of money γ is very low.
In this case, from (26), we see
τmt
1 + τmt
= Z (1 − k) . (27)
In such a case, the tax on real money balances is entirely determined by the returns in
the time transaction demand function s. This is exactly the result in Correia and Teles
(1996) and Teles (2003). As Teles (2003) remarks, ”if the transactions technology is
constant returns to scale, so that k = 1, the modified Friedman rule is optimal. If
k > 1, money should be subsidized, and if k < 1, money should be taxed.” So, we
see that our results nest Correia and Teles (1996) as a special case. Also, comparing
Proposition 2 to their result, we see that when the household has a choice of transactions
technologies, compared to the Corriea-Teles formula, real money balances will be
taxed more heavily. This is because increasing money balances have an additional
positive effect on the virtual time endowment et via sx when j∗t < 1. In other words,
their simple characterization of τmt in (27) is not robust to alternative forms of payment.
6.3 The consumption tax
We now turn to the optimal tax on consumption. We have the following characterization
of the optimal consumption tax in ad valorem form, as a fraction of the total price of
consumption, inclusive of both tax and time transactions costs:
Proposition 4 The optimal consumption tax as a fraction of the tax-inclusive price of
consumption is
τ ct
1 + τ ct +
( j∗t
)2
sxt
= ξt − ult
ξt
(Hlt − Hct )
1 + Hlt , (28)
where Hct = 1uct (ucct ct − uclt (et − lt ) − ult ect ) and Hlt is defined in (24).
This is proved in the “Appendix”. This formula is in fact very close to the formula for
the optimal consumption tax in the usual static case without a transactions technology,
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when the primal approach is used (Atkinson and Stiglitz 2015). The term of the left-
hand side of the formula is the consumption tax expressed as a fraction of the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. This can be seen by dividing
Eq. (9) by (10), giving the marginal rate of substitution equal to 1+τ ct +
( j∗t
)2
sxt . This
differs from the standard formula due to the inclusion of the term
( j∗t
)2
sxt , which is
the additional time transactions cost associated with an additional unit of consumption.
On the right-hand side, as already remarked, ξt−ult
ξt
is the value of one unit of labor
to the government, relative to its value to the household, and thus measures the social
gain from additional taxation at the margin. Second, by inspection, −Hct measures
the degree of complementarity between consumption and leisure; the higher this is,
other things equal, the higher the total effective tax on consumption, a well-known
result. Note that if there are no transactions costs, i.e. et ≡ 1, then Hct reduces to
the standard formula found in the primal approach to the static tax design problem
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 2015).24
One might ask why in our dynamic setting, the consumption tax formula is qualita-
tively identical to the static case. The reason is the following. In our dynamic model,
the government controls the marginal rate of substitution between present and future
consumption by the choice of the nominal return on the savings instrument i.e. bonds,
of it . This leaves the consumption tax as the instrument to control the marginal rate of
substitution within the period between consumption and leisure, as in the static case.
As a result, the formula for the optimal consumption tax in (28) is virtually identical to
the static case (conditional on the complications due to costly transactions, captured
by the term
( j∗t
)2
sxt ).
Finally, we can compare τ ct to the tax on fees. Using (24) to substitute out for μ, in
(A.8), we get:
τ
f
t
1 + τ ft
= ξt − ult
ξt
1
1 + Hlt
(
1 − k + 1 − 2 j
∗
t
j∗t
+ 2εxt 1 − j
∗
t
j∗t
)
. (29)
So, comparing (28) and (29), we see that there is no obvious link between τ ct , τ ft ;
the ratio of the two depends on k and εxt , as well as Hlt − Hct . To investigate further,
we turn to numerical simulations.
7 A calibratedmodel
To showcase the main theoretical results, we use a calibrated version of the model to
numerically solve for the optimal value of the three endogenously determined taxes,
τ
f
t , τ
c
t , τ
m
t . The aim is to provide a sense of the relative sizes of taxes, and how results
would vary with key exogenous parameters such as the returns to scale in the time
24 One might also ask how our result relates to the well-known Ramsey tax rules in static optimal tax theory.
The connection is as follows. First, in the special case where u is quasi-linear, i.e. u(c, l) = u(c)+l, Hlt = 0
and Hct = 1uct (ucct ct − ect ). If we assume furthermore that there are no transactions costs, et = 1 and
so ect = 0. Then, −Hct = − ucct ctuct is just one over the elasticity of demand for the consumption good, so(28) reduces just to the classic Ramsey inverse elasticity rule.
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Table 1 Parameter values
Parameter Description Values Source
θ Elasticity of utility w.r.t. consumption 1.0 Hall (1988), Gruber (2013) and others
η Elasticity of utility w.r.t. leisure 2.0 Mankiw et al. (1985)
A Leisure parameter 1.2 Calibrated
g Government expenditure 0.11 Calibrated
α Transaction cost parameter 0.018 Calibrated
f Bank fee 0.01–0.02 Philippon (2015) and Bazot (2018)
γ Resource cost of fiat money 0.02 Calibrated
k Degree of homogeneity of s 0–1
transactions cost function, k, and the cost of using the PA, f . These parameters are
particularly important for the following reasons. First, we already know that k plays
an important role in determining the optimal inflation tax. Furthermore, analytically,
we have shown that when k is small (at zero or close to it), τ f should be positive.
Second, empirically, technological innovation is driving f lower over time, and we
would like to know how this could affect payment service taxes.
In this illustration, we assume that the exogenous expenditure requirement gt is
constant over time at g, in which case the economy converges immediately to a steady
state. We use a standard iso-elastic functional form for utility in (1) of the form:
u (c, l) = 1
1 − θ
(
c1−θ − 1
)
+ A
1 − η
(
l1−η − 1
)
. (30)
In addition, we also assume the same functional form for s as in Proposition 2 i.e.
s (x, m) = α x
k+1
m
. (31)
Here, k measures returns to scale, as above. Special cases include k = 0, which is the
Baumol-Tobin case, and k = 1,which is the specification of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2010).
Using (30), (31), all the equilibrium conditions of the model, plus the first-order
conditions to the government’s optimal tax problem, can be written in a simplified form
at the steady state. The details are given in the Online Supplementary “Appendix”.
In particular, the equilibrium conditions can be written as a number of simultaneous
equations in unknowns
(
c, l, m, j∗, λ, τ c, τm, τ f , Z) as described in the Online Sup-
plementary Appendix. As defined in Proposition 1, Z = μul
ξ
is the value of one unit
of labor to the government, relative to its value to the household, and thus the social
gain from additional taxation at the margin.
Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters. First, θ, η are the utility function
parameters, and have the interpretation of the inverses of the inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution of consumption and leisure, respectively. There are a very large range
of estimates of θ, ranging from an early empirical study, Hall (1988), which concludes
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that it is not likely to be larger than 10, to more recent studies which give values of θ of
around 1 (Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio 2003; Gruber 2013). Given this range, we
take a central value of 1. Early empirical studies find η to be greater than 1 (Mankiw
et al. 1985), while more recent studies (Smets and Wouters 2007, 2005) find η to be
near 2, and we therefore set η = 2.
Next, A, g are set to yield a plausible ratio of government expenditure to output of
around 0.3.25 Then, α is set to target a realistic value for s. Based on a recent study
of transactions costs, we assume that the household spends around 10 hours a year
managing cash (Mazzotta and Chakravorti 2014). This includes time spent visiting
ATMs, etc. This gives a target value for s of 10 divided by total number of hours in
the year, i.e. 16 × 365 = 5840, which gives s = 0.17%. Next, our central value of
f is set at 0.015, based on Philippon (2015) and Bazot (2018), who calculate that
the costs of financial intermediation for the banking sector in the US and Europe are
around 2.5–3% of assets intermediated.26 Finally, γ is set to ensure that the share of
transactions that are cash, measured by j∗, is around 50%, a reasonable figure for
the US and Europe.27 Finally, k, the degree of homogeneity of s, is chosen to range
between 0 and 1, which covers all the usual specifications in the literature.
Before we turn to numerical simulations of the optimal taxes, we perform a simple
comparative statics exercise to understand how key endogenous variables ( j∗, m, c, l)
respond the changes in exogenous taxes (τ f , τm), varying τ c residually to satisfy
the government budget constraint. The details are reported in the Online Appendix
Section C. They show that as expected, ( j∗, m) rise as PAs are more heavily taxed,
and fall as cash in more heavily taxed. Other variables are not not very sensitive to the
payment service taxes.
Now we turn to our main results. Figures 1 and 2 show how the optimal taxes
τ c, τm, τ f change as the key parameters k, f change. Note that τ c, τm, τ f are all of
the same order of magnitude, and the implied interest rate i , from the relationship (6),
takes a sensible rate of values between 1 and 3% (not reported here).
In Fig. 1, k varies between 0 and 1, while f is fixed. This figure shows that first,
both τm, τ f decrease markedly as the returns to scale in transactions costs increase,
though τm remains positive at k = 1. Also, we see that τm is consistently bigger than
τm , consistent with Proposition 1. We also see that for k above 0.5 or so, τ f becomes
a subsidy, a possibility that was shown theoretically in the previous section. We also
25 Output is y = 1 − l − s.
26 The precise calculation is as follows. The real value of consumption purchased using PAs is
c
(
1 − ( j∗)2
)
, and the real value of resources used in payments is f (1 − j∗) . So, in the model, the
cost of bank payment services as a share of consumption is f (1− j
∗)
c
(
1−( j∗)2
) = f
c(1+ j∗) . From Schmiedel
et al. (2012), and the discussion in the introduction, we estimate this to be to be about 3%. So, we set
f
c(1+ j∗) = 0.03. In our model, which calibrated to a consumption to GDP ratio of 0.7, c = 0.25 on
average, and also also j∗ is calibrated to 0.5. Substituting these elements into the last equation gives a value
of f = 0.011. This turns out to give rise to computational problems, and so we choose a slightly higher
central value of f = 0.015.
27 Matheny et al. (2016, p3) reports that “In 2015, cash remained the most frequently used retail payment
instrument, used in nearly one-third (32%) of all transactions, including bill payments”. Esselink and
Hernández (2017) and Bagnall et al. (2016) report an even higher ratio of cash usage.
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Fig. 1 Optimal tax rates as k increases. Note: In the figure, f = 0.019 rather than our central value of
f = 0.015
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Fig. 2 Optimal tax rates as f increases. Note: In the figure, k = 1
see that real money balances should be taxed, τm > 0, even when k = 1. This is
consistent with our theoretical finding in the previous section that the Correia-Teles
result is not robust to alternative forms of payment. Finally, we see that both taxes are
never zero at once, meaning that the use of cash and PAs is always distorted by the
tax system, consistently with Proposition 3.
In Fig. 2, f varies between 0.01 and 0.02. This figure shows that both τm, τ f
decrease markedly as the fee to scale in transactions costs increase, though τm remains
positive at k = 1. This figure is again consistent with our theoretical results. For
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example, we see that τm is consistently bigger than τm , consistent with Proposition 1.
We also see that for f above 0.015 or so, τ f becomes a subsidy, a possibility that was
shown theoretically in the previous section. One intuition for why τ f can be negative
can be gleaned from (A.3). As f rises, j∗t increases i.e. cash is used more, and this
tends to make the effect of j∗t on the virtual leisure endowment, e jt positive. So, in
order to indirectly tax this virtual leisure endowment, j∗t should be reduced, which
can be achieved by subsidizing PAs.
8 Conclusions
This paper has considered the optimal taxation of payment services, when realistically,
the household can use either cash and or a bank account with services, such as debit
cards, for the purchase of different varieties of goods. The setting is an extension of
Correia and Teles (1996), to allow for the use of bank accounts as a form of payment, as
in Freeman and Kydland (2000). Our first contribution is to develop simple formulae
for the optimal ad valorem taxes on both real money balances and payment fees. For
common specifications of the time transaction cost function, we can show that the
tax on real money balances is always greater than the tax on fees, and also, while the
former is always positive, the tax on fees may be negative.
Numerical results, using a calibrated version of the model, yielded additional
insights. We found that both the inflation tax and the tax on fees decrease markedly as
the returns to scale in transactions costs increase from zero to one. The results show
also that both the inflation tax and the tax on fees increase as the bank fee decreases;
this is interesting as the move away from cash is ultimately driven by technological
innovation that reduces fees. Moreover, when the fee is large, the fee tax can be nega-
tive, i.e. bank fees should be subsidized. We also find that the tax on bank fees, can be
greater or less than the rate of consumption tax, although both taxes are of the same
order of magnitude. So, our results show fairly robustly that this part of banking sector
activity should probably not be left untaxed.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
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Appendix
Construction of the implementation constraint From (9)–(12) we have ,
χt = β
t ult
λ
,
χt it
(
1 + τ ct
) = β
t ult
λ
(−smt ) ,
χt
(
1 + τ ct
) = β
t uct
λ
− χt
( j∗t
)2
sxt = β
t uct
λ
− β
t ult
λ
( j∗t
)2
sxt ,
χt f
(
1 + τ ft
) (
1 − j∗t
) = β
t ult
λ
sxt 2ct j∗t
(
1 − j∗t
)
.
So, substituting these expressions in (8), we get:
∞∑
t=0
β t
(
ct
(
uct − ult
( j∗t
)2
sxt
)
− ult smt mt + ult sxt 2ct j∗t
(
1 − j∗t
))
=
∞∑
t=0
β t ult (1 − lt − st ) . (A.1)
Rearranging (A.1) gives (14) as required. 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1 Combining first-order conditions (11), (21) with 6, and (12)
with (22), we get general formulae for the optimal taxes:
τmt =
μult emt
γ ξt
, τ
f
t = −
μult e j t
f ξt . (A.2)
Next, using using (A.2) and (17), we can compute et = (k − 1) st −sxt 2ct j∗t
(
1 − j∗t
)
e jt = (1 − k) sxt ct j∗t − 2sxxt ct 2
( j∗t
)2 (1 − j∗t
) − sxt ct
(
1 − 2 j∗t
)
,
to compute e jt , we see that
τ
f
t = −2
μult
f ξt
(
(1 − k) sxt ct j∗t + 2sxxt ct 2
( j∗t
)2 (1 − j∗t
) + sxt ct
(
1 − 2 j∗t
))
. (A.3)
Then, using the household optimization condition (12) to substitute out for f , we
get
τ
f
t
1 + τ ft
= μult
ξt sxt ct j∗t
(
(1 − k) sxt ct j∗t + 2sxxt ct 2
( j∗t
)2 (1 − j∗t
) + sxt ct
(
1 − 2 j∗t
))
. (A.4)
Finally, simplifying the right-hand side of (A.4), and using xt = ( j∗t )ct , we get
τ
f
t
1 + τ ft
= Z
(
1 − k + 1 − 2 j
∗
t
j∗t
+ 2εxt 1 − j
∗
t
j∗t
)
, εxt = sxxt x t
sxt
> 0, (A.5)
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where Z = μult
ξt
.
For the optimal inflation tax, the argument is similar. First, using (A.2) and (17), to
compute emt , we get:
τmt =
Z
γ
(
(k − 1) smt − sxmt 2ct j∗t
(
1 − j∗t
))
. (A.6)
Next, using the household optimization condition (11) and the definition of the inflation
tax (6), we get a formula for γ :
γ = − smt
1 + τmt
. (A.7)
Then combining (A.6) and (A.7) gives
τmt
1 + τmt
= Z
(
1 − k + 2εmt 1 − j
∗
t
j∗t
)
εmt = sxmt xt
smt
> 0,
as required. 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 If s = α xk+1
m
, then it is easily checked that εxt = k, εmt = k+1,
so (25) (26) become
τ
f
t
1 + τ ft
= Z
(
1 − k + 1 − 2 j
∗
t
j∗t
+ 2k 1 − j
∗
t
j∗t
)
, (A.8)
τmt
1 + τmt
= Z
(
1 − k + 2(k + 1)1 − j
∗
t
j∗t
)
. (A.9)
Assume to the contrary that τ ft ≥ τmt . Then from (A.8), (A.9), as Z > 0, we see
that
1 − 2 j∗t
j∗t
+ 2k 1 − j
∗
t
j∗t
≥ 2(k + 1)1 − j
∗
t
j∗t
,
which rearranges to 1−2 j
∗
t
1− j∗t ≥ 2, which is impossible. To complete the proof, we
note that the term in brackets in (A.8) is positive if j∗t < 2k1+3k , and the term in brackets
in (A.9) is positive if j∗t < 1+2k1+3k . 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 (i) From (19)–(22), we have:
Wct
Wlt
= uct
ult
1 + μ (1 + Hct )
1 + μ (1 + Hlt ) = 1 +
( j∗t
)2
sxt (A.10)
where Hlt , Hct are defined in the paper above. And, from (9),(10):
uct
ult
= 1 + τ ct +
( j∗t
)2
sxt (A.11)
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Combining (A.10), (A.11), we get
(
1 + τ ct +
( j∗t
)2
sxt
)
(1 + μ (1 + Hct )) =
(
1 + ( j∗t
)2
sxt
)
(1 + μ (1 + Hlt )) .
(A.12)
Rearranging (A.12), we get:
τ ct (1 + μ (1 + Hct )) = μ (Hlt − Hct )
(
1 + ( j∗t
)2
sxt
)
. (A.13)
Adding τ ct μ (Hlt − Hct ) to both sides, and and rearranging, we get
τ ct
1 + ( j∗t
)2
sxt + τ ct
= μ (Hlt − Hct )
1 + μ (1 + Hlt ) .
Using (A.13), and (24) and rearranging, we get
τ ct
1 + ( j∗t
)2
sxt + τ ct
=
(
ξt − ult
ξt
)
(Hlt − Hct )
1 + Hlt , (A.14)
as required. 
unionsq
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